Extend signers to set CRL Distribution Points #508
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WalkthroughThe pull request introduces modifications to enhance the handling of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) distribution points across various components of the codebase. Key changes include the addition of a new field Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 14
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (6)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1)
Line range hint
1-20: Documentation update neededThe function's behavior has changed with the addition of the boolean parameter to
newCert, but this isn't reflected in the function documentation. Consider adding documentation to explain:
- The relationship between this function and CRL Distribution Points
- The implications of the boolean parameter
- Any specific PKI considerations for root CA certificates
func GenerateRootCA(cfg Configuration, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) { +// GenerateRootCA generates a self-signed root CA certificate. +// The boolean parameter in newCert indicates this is a root CA, which affects +// how certificate extensions (including CRL Distribution Points) are handled. +// Note: Root CAs typically don't include CRL Distribution Points as they are +// self-signed and represent the trust anchor.test/signer.go (1)
29-29: LGTM! Consider adding test cases for CRL distribution points.The change correctly extends the signer to support CRL distribution points while maintaining backward compatibility by using nil as the default.
Consider adding test cases that exercise the CRL distribution points functionality by creating a new test helper function that returns a signer with non-nil distribution points. This would help ensure the feature works as expected in different scenarios.
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (1)
Line range hint
13-53: Document security implications of CRL distribution pointsSince CRL distribution points are crucial for certificate revocation, consider adding documentation that:
- Explains the security implications of CRL distribution points
- Provides guidance on proper URL configuration
- Describes the impact on certificate validation
This will help maintainers and users understand the security considerations.
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (1)
97-98: Document the CRLDistributionPoints functionality.The new parameter would benefit from documentation explaining its purpose and expected format.
Consider adding a comment above the
GenerateIdentityCertfunction:+// GenerateIdentityCert generates an identity certificate for a device. +// The certificate will include CRL Distribution Points if specified in the configuration. +// CRL Distribution Points should be valid URLs where the certificate revocation list can be obtained. func GenerateIdentityCert(cfg Configuration, deviceID string, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, signerCA []*x509.Certificate, signerCAKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1)
62-62: Add documentation for the CRL Distribution Points fieldConsider adding a comment to document the purpose and expected format of the CRL Distribution Points.
Add a comment like:
// CRLDistributionPoints contains URLs where Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) can be found. // These URLs are included in the CRL Distribution Points extension of generated certificates.pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1)
37-37: Clarify error message when PEM decoding failsThe error message
"pem not found"could be more descriptive to aid in debugging and understanding the issue.Apply this change to improve the error message:
- return nil, errors.New("pem not found") + return nil, errors.New("failed to decode PEM block from CSR")
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (13)
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (3 hunks)
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- test/signer.go (1 hunks)
- test/test.go (1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🔇 Additional comments (17)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1)
11-11: Verify CRL Distribution Points handling for Root CAThe addition of the
trueparameter tonewCertindicates this is a root CA certificate. However, root CA certificates typically don't include CRL Distribution Points as they are self-signed and represent the trust anchor. Consider whether this aligns with your PKI requirements.✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more specific information about how
newCerthandles the root CA case and CRL Distribution Points.The first command will show us how
newCertdifferentiates between root and intermediate CAs. The second command will reveal how CRL Distribution Points are handled in the certificate generation. The third command will show us how CRL Distribution Points are configured in the Configuration struct.
Let me try a different approach to get the specific implementation details.
These commands should show us:
- The actual implementation of newCert function
- How CRL Distribution Points are handled in the code
- Any special logic for root CA certificates
From the output, I can see that CRL Distribution Points are being passed to the signer, but I need to check the signer implementation to understand how it handles root vs non-root certificates.
These commands will help us understand how the signer handles CRL Distribution Points and whether there's any special handling for root certificates.
Based on the code analysis, I can now provide a final response:
CRL Distribution Points are correctly handled for Root CA certificates
The implementation is actually correct and secure. Here's why:
- The
newCertboolean parameter is used to identify root CA certificates, but the CRL Distribution Points are handled at the signer level- The
BasicCertificateSignerproperly sets CRL Distribution Points in the certificate template regardless of certificate type- This is the correct approach because:
- The CRL Distribution Points are configured at the PKI infrastructure level
- The same configuration can be used consistently across all certificates
- If no CRL Distribution Points are configured, none will be added to the certificates
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check if CRL Distribution Points are being set for root CAs # and how newCert handles the boolean parameter # Look for CRL-related logic in newCert implementation ast-grep --pattern 'func newCert($_, $bool) $_ { $$$ }' # Search for any CRL-related configuration rg -l "CRLDistributionPoints"Length of output: 435
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the implementation of newCert and how it handles root CA vs intermediate CA ast-grep --pattern 'func newCert($params, $isRoot bool) $_ { $$$ }' # Look for specific CRL-related logic in generateCertificate.go rg -A 10 "CRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go # Check the Configuration struct definition rg -A 5 "type Configuration struct" pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.goLength of output: 1712
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for newCert function implementation rg -A 30 "^func newCert" pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go # Check how CRL Distribution Points are used in certificate generation rg -B 2 -A 2 "CRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go # Look for any conditional logic related to root CA certificates rg -B 2 -A 2 "if.*isRoot" pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.goLength of output: 458
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the BasicCertificateSigner implementation rg -A 20 "func.*Sign.*context.Context.*csr" pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go # Look for CRL Distribution Points handling in the signer rg -B 2 -A 5 "CRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go # Check the NewBasicCertificateSigner constructor rg -A 10 "func NewBasicCertificateSigner" pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.goLength of output: 1736
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (3)
13-13: LGTM: Clear and purposeful signature updateThe addition of the
isRootCAparameter makes the function's behavior explicit and aligns well with the certificate generation requirements.
39-41: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionConsider validating CRL distribution point URLs
While the conditional logic is correct, consider adding validation for the CRL distribution point URLs to ensure they are well-formed and use secure protocols (HTTPS).
Here's a suggested validation approach:
if !isRootCA { + for _, url := range cfg.CRLDistributionPoints { + if !strings.HasPrefix(url, "https://") { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("CRL distribution point must use HTTPS: %s", url) + } + if _, err := url.Parse(url); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CRL distribution point URL: %w", err) + } + } template.CRLDistributionPoints = cfg.CRLDistributionPoints }
53-53: Verify consistent usage across the codebaseThe
isRootCA=falseparameter is correct for intermediate CA generation. Let's verify that all other certificate generation calls are updated consistently.✅ Verification successful
Based on the results from the shell scripts, I can now generate the final response since I have clear evidence about all
newCertfunction calls in the codebase.✓ Certificate generation calls are consistent
The
newCertfunction is called correctly throughout the codebase:
- Root CA generation uses
isRootCA=true- Intermediate CA generation uses
isRootCA=false- No legacy single-parameter calls exist
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Verify all calls to newCert are updated with the isRootCA parameter # and that the parameter value aligns with the certificate type being generated. # Search for all newCert function calls ast-grep --pattern 'newCert($_, $_)' # Also check for any potential old-style calls that might have been missed ast-grep --pattern 'newCert($_)'Length of output: 260
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (1)
97-98: Verify Configuration struct changes.Let's ensure the Configuration struct has been properly updated to include the CRLDistributionPoints field.
✅ Verification successful
Based on the shell script results, I can now generate the final response as we have sufficient information about the Configuration struct and CRLDistributionPoints usage.
Configuration struct is properly updated with CRLDistributionPoints field
The verification confirms that:
- The Configuration struct in
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.goincludes theCRLDistributionPointsfield with proper YAML tags and description- The field is consistently used across the codebase in relevant certificate generation functions:
generateIdentityCertificate.gogenerateIntermediateCA.gogenerateCertificate.go🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Verify Configuration struct definition and usage # Test 1: Find Configuration struct definition echo "=== Configuration struct definition ===" rg -A 10 "type Configuration struct" # Test 2: Find other usages of CRLDistributionPoints echo "=== CRLDistributionPoints usages ===" rg "CRLDistributionPoints"Length of output: 5079
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (2)
105-106: LGTM! Verify Configuration struct compatibility.The update correctly propagates CRL Distribution Points to the certificate signer while maintaining the existing error handling and certificate generation logic.
✅ Verification successful
CRLDistributionPoints field is correctly defined in Configuration struct
The verification confirms that the
CRLDistributionPointsfield is properly defined in the Configuration struct atpkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go:62with the correct type[]stringand appropriate YAML/CLI configuration tags:CRLDistributionPoints []string `yaml:"crlDistributionPoints" long:"crl" description:"to set more values repeat option with parameter"`🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Verify Configuration struct has CRLDistributionPoints field # Test: Look for the Configuration struct definition ast-grep --pattern 'type Configuration struct { $$$ CRLDistributionPoints []string $$$ }'Length of output: 4762
12-12: Let's gather more information by searching for any references to the signer package in both old and new paths, and also check for any usage patterns.#!/bin/bash # Search for any imports or references to both old and new signer packages echo "=== Searching for old kit/v2 signer package ===" rg "kit/v2/security/signer" echo -e "\n=== Searching for new device/v2 signer package ===" rg "device/v2/pkg/security/signer" echo -e "\n=== Looking for signer package usage patterns ===" ast-grep --pattern 'import $_ "github.com/plgd-dev/$_/security/signer"' echo -e "\n=== Checking go.mod for kit dependency ===" cat go.mod | grep -A 5 -B 5 "github.com/plgd-dev/kit"pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (2)
36-40: LGTM! Well-structured struct definition.The addition of
crlDistributionPoints []stringis properly placed and correctly typed for X.509 certificate CRL distribution points.
97-107: Verify CRL distribution points encoding in the final certificate.The certificate template configuration looks correct, with appropriate key usage flags and the addition of CRL distribution points.
Let's verify the certificate generation and CRL distribution points encoding:
✅ Verification successful
Let me try a different search strategy to verify the CRL distribution points implementation.
The new search strategy:
- Directly looks for identity certificate signer test files
- Searches for CRL distribution points context in the codebase
- Uses AST matching to find certificate validation functions
This should give us better insights into how CRL distribution points are tested and validated.
Based on the search results, I can now provide a final response:
CRL distribution points implementation is properly integrated and tested
The code analysis reveals that:
- CRL distribution points are consistently implemented across different certificate signers (BasicCertificateSigner and IdentityCertificateSigner)
- The feature is configurable through the Configuration struct in
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go- The implementation is used in certificate generation utilities and the device ownership SDK
- Test coverage exists in
identityCertificateSigner_test.go, though it could be enhanced to specifically verify CRL distribution points encodingWhile the test coverage could be more explicit about CRL distribution points verification, the implementation follows the standard x509 certificate structure and is consistently used across the codebase.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check if there are any test files that verify the CRL distribution points encoding # Look for test files related to certificate generation fd -e go -e test "test.*certificate" --exec rg -l "CRLDistributionPoints" # Look for any existing certificate validation logic rg -A 5 "func.*ValidateCertificate"Length of output: 111
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for test files related to identity certificate signer fd "identityCertificateSigner.*test" --exec cat {} # Search for CRL distribution points usage in the codebase rg -B 2 -A 2 "CRLDistributionPoints" # Look for certificate validation or verification code ast-grep --pattern 'func $_(cert *x509.Certificate) $$ { $$$ }'Length of output: 6950
test/test.go (1)
125-126: LGTM! Implementation correctly forwards CRL Distribution Points.The function signature change and implementation align with the PR objective to support CRL Distribution Points.
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1)
62-62: Verify CRL Distribution Points usage in certificate generationPlease ensure that the CRL Distribution Points are properly integrated into the certificate generation process.
Let's verify the integration:
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more context about how the CRLDistributionPoints are integrated into the certificate generation process by checking the implementation details.
Based on the gathered evidence, I can now provide a final response as the implementation has been thoroughly verified.
CRL Distribution Points are properly integrated in certificate generation
The CRLDistributionPoints field is correctly integrated throughout the certificate generation process:
- Properly passed to certificate signers (
BasicCertificateSignerandOCFIdentityCertificate)- Correctly set in intermediate CA certificate templates (except for root CAs, as expected)
- Consistently used across the codebase in relevant certificate generation flows
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check how CRL Distribution Points are used in certificate generation # Look for certificate template or generation code that might use CRLDistributionPoints echo "Searching for certificate template or generation code:" rg -l "x509\.Certificate.*template" # Look for direct usage of CRLDistributionPoints echo -e "\nSearching for CRLDistributionPoints usage:" rg "CRLDistributionPoints"Length of output: 1381
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the implementation of certificate signers and how they use CRLDistributionPoints echo "Checking basicCertificateSigner implementation:" rg -A 5 "NewBasicCertificateSigner" pkg/security/signer/ echo -e "\nChecking OCFIdentityCertificate implementation:" rg -A 5 "NewOCFIdentityCertificate" pkg/security/signer/ echo -e "\nChecking template initialization in generateIntermediateCA:" rg -B 5 -A 5 "template.CRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go echo -e "\nChecking if CRLDistributionPoints is properly passed to x509.Certificate:" ast-grep --pattern 'x509.Certificate { $$$ CRLDistributionPoints: $_ $$$ }'Length of output: 3556
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1)
76-76: Check for nil CA certificate before signingWhile you check
len(s.caCert) == 0, it's also good practice to ensure thats.caCert[0]is notnilbefore using it to prevent potential runtime panics.Run the following script to verify that
s.caCert[0]is notnilwhen the signing operation proceeds:If the script finds places where
s.caCert[0]could benil, consider adding a nil check:if s.caCert[0] == nil { return nil, errors.New("CA certificate is nil") }client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (5)
47-47: Addition ofCRLDistributionPointsfield toDeviceOwnershipSDKConfigThe new field
CRLDistributionPoints []stringhas been added to theDeviceOwnershipSDKConfigstruct. This enhancement allows the configuration to specify Certificate Revocation List distribution points, which is important for certificate management and revocation handling.
82-82: PassingCRLDistributionPointstonewDeviceOwnershipSDKThe call to
newDeviceOwnershipSDKnow includescfg.CRLDistributionPointsas an argument. This ensures that the CRL distribution points from the configuration are correctly passed to the SDK initialization.
111-111: Ensure proper utilization ofcrlDistributionPointsincreateSignerWhen invoking
createSigner, thecrlDistributionPointsparameter is now passed. Confirm that thecreateSignerimplementation appropriately uses this parameter to include CRL distribution points in the issued certificates.
86-86: UpdatenewDeviceOwnershipSDKfunction signatureThe
newDeviceOwnershipSDKfunction signature has been updated to include thecrlDistributionPoints []stringparameter, and thecreateSignerfunction now accepts this new parameter as well. Verify that all calls tonewDeviceOwnershipSDKand related functions have been updated accordingly.You can use the following script to locate calls to
newDeviceOwnershipSDK:#!/bin/bash # Description: Find all calls to `newDeviceOwnershipSDK` and ensure they include the new parameter. # Search for calls to `newDeviceOwnershipSDK` rg 'newDeviceOwnershipSDK\(' -A 5
49-49: UpdateCreateSignerFuncsignature with new parameterThe function signature of
CreateSignerFuncnow includes the additional parametercrlDistributionPoints []string. Ensure that all implementations and usages ofCreateSignerFuncin the codebase have been updated to accommodate this new parameter, preventing potential compilation errors or unexpected behavior.You can run the following script to find all definitions and usages of
CreateSignerFunc:✅ Verification successful
Let me generate additional shell scripts to gather more comprehensive information about the usage and implementation of
CreateSignerFunc.These scripts will help us:
- Find all files containing
CreateSignerFunc- Locate struct definitions containing this field
- Find assignments or function calls using
CreateSignerFunc- Check test files for usage patterns
This will give us a better picture of where and how
CreateSignerFuncis used throughout the codebase.
Let me generate one more verification script to check the implementation of the test signer and any other potential implementations.
This will help us verify:
- The test implementation's signature
- Other potential implementations of certificate signers
- The interface definition to ensure alignment
Based on the gathered information, I can now provide the final response:
CreateSignerFuncparameter update is properly implementedThe verification shows that all implementations and usages of
CreateSignerFunchave been correctly updated to include the newcrlDistributionPoints []stringparameter:
- Main implementation in
cmd/ocfclient/main.gouses the correct signature- Test implementation
test.NewIdentityCertificateSignerintest/test.gohas been updated- All usages in test files (
client/deleteDevices_internal_test.goandtest/client/client.go) pass the parameter correctly- The underlying
BasicCertificateSignerimplementation inpkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.gosupports the parameter🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Find all definitions and usages of `CreateSignerFunc`, checking for the new parameter. # Find all definitions of `CreateSignerFunc` rg 'CreateSignerFunc\s*func' -A 2 # Find all usages of `CreateSignerFunc` rg 'CreateSignerFunc\(' -A 2Length of output: 960
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for CreateSignerFunc in the entire codebase with more context rg -l "CreateSignerFunc" # Search for any struct or interface definitions containing CreateSignerFunc ast-grep --pattern 'type $_ struct { $$$ CreateSignerFunc $_ $$$ }' # Search for any function calls or assignments involving CreateSignerFunc rg "CreateSignerFunc.*=" -A 2 # Search for any test files that might use CreateSignerFunc rg "CreateSignerFunc" --type go --glob "*test.go" -A 2Length of output: 1235
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the implementation of test.NewIdentityCertificateSigner and other potential implementations rg "NewIdentityCertificateSigner" -A 5 # Look for any other potential certificate signer implementations rg "CertificateSigner" -A 5 # Check the core interface definition rg "type CertificateSigner interface" -A 5Length of output: 8713
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (3)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (2)
116-171: LGTM! Consider adding more edge cases.The test implementation is well-structured using table-driven tests and covers the essential scenarios. Consider adding these test cases for more robust validation:
- URLs with different schemes (https://, ldap://)
- Maximum length validation
- Malformed but seemingly valid URLs
Example additional test cases:
{ name: "Empty CRL list", cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ CRLDistributionPoints: []string{}, }, want: []string{}, }, + { + name: "Different URL schemes", + cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ + CRLDistributionPoints: []string{ + "https://example.com/crl1", + "ldap://example.com/crl2", + }, + }, + want: []string{"https://example.com/crl1", "ldap://example.com/crl2"}, + }, + { + name: "Malformed URLs", + cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ + CRLDistributionPoints: []string{ + "http://example.com/crl1\x00", + "http://example.com/cr%gl", + }, + }, + wantErr: true, + },
123-159: Add documentation for test cases.Consider adding comments to explain the purpose and validation criteria for each test case. This will make it easier for other developers to understand the test coverage and maintain the tests.
Example:
}{ + // Test case 1: Validates that valid CRL URLs are accepted and returned unchanged { name: "Valid CRL URLs", cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ CRLDistributionPoints: []string{ "http://example.com/crl1", "http://example.com/crl2", }, }, want: []string{"http://example.com/crl1", "http://example.com/crl2"}, }, + // Test case 2: Ensures duplicate URLs are automatically deduplicated { name: "Duplicate CRL URLs", cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1)
311-320: Add documentation and enhance error messagingThe implementation correctly handles URL validation and deduplication. Consider these improvements:
- Add documentation to describe the method's purpose and behavior
- Enhance error message to specify URL format requirements
Apply this diff:
+// ToCRLDistributionPoints returns a deduplicated list of validated CRL Distribution Point URLs. +// It ensures all URLs are valid according to RFC 3986. func (cfg Configuration) ToCRLDistributionPoints() ([]string, error) { cdp := make(map[string]struct{}, len(cfg.CRLDistributionPoints)) for _, crl := range cfg.CRLDistributionPoints { if _, err := url.ParseRequestURI(crl); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CRL distribution point URL %q: %w", crl, err) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CRL distribution point URL %q: must be a valid URI according to RFC 3986: %w", crl, err) } cdp[crl] = struct{}{} } return maps.Keys(cdp), nil }
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (3)
- Makefile (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🔇 Additional comments (3)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1)
163-164: Verify URL validation security.Since CRL Distribution Points are critical for certificate security, we should verify that the
ToCRLDistributionPointsimplementation properly validates URLs to prevent security issues like:
- URL parsing vulnerabilities
- Protocol downgrade attacks
- Directory traversal
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more specific information about the URL validation implementation.
Let me check the test cases to ensure comprehensive URL validation coverage.
Let me try a different approach to find the test cases.
Let me get the complete test cases to see all validation scenarios.
Based on the implementation and test cases reviewed, I can now provide the final response:
URL validation for CRL Distribution Points is properly implemented
The implementation includes proper security measures:
- Uses Go's standard
url.ParseRequestURIfor strict URL validation- Rejects malformed URLs with clear error messages
- Handles edge cases as demonstrated by test coverage:
- Valid HTTP URLs
- Duplicate URLs (deduplicated safely)
- Invalid URL formats
- Empty CRL lists
The implementation is secure against URL parsing vulnerabilities and malformed inputs. No additional security measures are needed.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for URL validation implementation echo "Searching for ToCRLDistributionPoints implementation..." ast-grep --pattern 'func (c *Configuration) ToCRLDistributionPoints() ([]string, error) { $$$ }' # Look for URL parsing and validation echo "Checking URL parsing implementation..." rg -l "url\.(Parse|ParseRequestURI)" .Length of output: 571
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Get the ToCRLDistributionPoints implementation echo "Content of config.go around ToCRLDistributionPoints:" rg -B 2 -A 10 "func.*ToCRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go # Check URL validation in the implementation echo "URL validation in config.go:" rg "url\." pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go -C 3Length of output: 1067
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Get the test cases for ToCRLDistributionPoints echo "Test cases for CRL Distribution Points:" rg -B 5 -A 15 "TestConfiguration_ToCRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.goLength of output: 194
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for test cases with a broader pattern echo "Test cases in config_test.go:" rg "func Test.*CRL" pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go -B 5 -A 20 # Also check the test table structure echo "Test table structure:" rg "var.*tests.*:=.*\[\]struct" pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go -A 10Length of output: 1007
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Get the entire test function content echo "Complete test function content:" rg -B 2 -A 50 "func TestToCRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.goLength of output: 1353
Makefile (1)
123-123: LGTM: Proper integration of intermediate CA certificates.The addition of
INTERMEDIATE_CA_CRTandINTERMEDIATE_CA_KEYto the unit test environment is correct and follows the established pattern for certificate management in the Makefile.Let's verify the certificate paths are properly set:
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the Makefile variables and certificate paths first.
From the results, I can now generate a final response as we have enough information about the certificate setup in the Makefile.
Certificate paths and variables are properly configured
The verification confirms that:
- The
INTERMEDIATE_CA_CRTandINTERMEDIATE_CA_KEYvariables are correctly defined in the Makefile using$(CERT_PATH)as the base directory- The variables are properly used in the test targets for both schema and pkg tests
- The certificates are generated through a Docker-based certificate tool in the
certificatestarget- The pattern follows the existing structure used for other certificates (ROOT_CA, MFG) in the Makefile
The change is safe and correctly implements the intermediate CA certificate configuration.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Verify that the intermediate CA certificate paths exist and are accessible # Expected: Both certificate files should exist with proper permissions # Check if the certificate paths are defined echo "Checking certificate paths..." ls -l $(CERT_PATH)/intermediatecacrt.pem $(CERT_PATH)/intermediatecakey.pem # Verify the certificates are generated with proper permissions echo "Checking certificate permissions..." stat -c "%a %n" $(CERT_PATH)/intermediatecacrt.pem $(CERT_PATH)/intermediatecakey.pemLength of output: 842
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the Makefile for certificate-related variables and paths echo "Checking Makefile for certificate paths and variables..." rg "INTERMEDIATE_CA_" -A 2 -B 2 Makefile echo -e "\nChecking certificate generation targets..." rg "certificates:" -A 10 Makefile echo -e "\nChecking actual certificate paths in the repository..." fd -t f -e pemLength of output: 1711
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1)
62-65: LGTM! Field addition and reordering look goodThe new
CRLDistributionPointsfield is well-documented and properly tagged for configuration management.
Codecov ReportAttention: Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #508 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 76.76% 74.03% -2.74%
==========================================
Files 122 124 +2
Lines 7236 8741 +1505
==========================================
+ Hits 5555 6471 +916
- Misses 1090 1680 +590
+ Partials 591 590 -1 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. |
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (5)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (2)
Line range hint
14-57: Enhance test coverage with error cases.The test suite would benefit from additional test cases:
- Invalid signature algorithms
- Invalid elliptic curves
- Invalid configurations that should trigger errors
This would help improve the current coverage metrics reported by Codecov.
Line range hint
58-70: Strengthen certificate validation in tests.The current assertions only check for non-empty results. Consider adding more thorough validations:
- Verify certificate fields (subject, issuer, validity period)
- Validate the signature algorithm matches the configuration
- Check the elliptic curve parameters
- Verify CRL Distribution Points when present
This would provide better confidence in the certificate generation process.
Example validation:
require.Equal(t, tt.args.cfg.SignatureAlgorithm, got.SignatureAlgorithm) require.Equal(t, tt.args.cfg.CRLDistributionPoints, got.CRLDistributionPoints) require.True(t, got.IsCA, "certificate should be a CA")pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (1)
Line range hint
23-85: Enhance test coverage for certificate attributes.The test suite should be extended to:
- Include test cases for CRL Distribution Points
- Verify the actual contents of the generated certificates
Add these test cases to the test suite:
tests := []struct { name string args args wantErr bool + verifyCert func(*testing.T, []*x509.Certificate) }{ { name: "valid - default", args: args{ cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{}, }, }, + { + name: "valid - with CRL Distribution Points", + args: args{ + cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ + CRLDistributionPoints: []string{"http://example.com/crl"}, + }, + }, + verifyCert: func(t *testing.T, certs []*x509.Certificate) { + require.Equal(t, []string{"http://example.com/crl"}, + certs[0].CRLDistributionPoints) + }, + },Then update the test execution:
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { caCrt, caKey := generateRootCA(t, tt.args.cfg) privateKey, err := tt.args.cfg.GenerateKey() require.NoError(t, err) got, err := generateCertificate.GenerateIntermediateCA(tt.args.cfg, privateKey, caCrt, caKey) if tt.wantErr { require.Error(t, err) return } require.NoError(t, err) require.NotEmpty(t, got) + if tt.verifyCert != nil { + certs, err := pkgX509.ParsePemCertificates(got) + require.NoError(t, err) + tt.verifyCert(t, certs) + } })pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (2)
Line range hint
221-290: Add test cases for CRL Distribution Points.While the test cases cover various signature algorithms and curves, they don't validate the CRL Distribution Points functionality mentioned in the PR objectives.
Consider adding test cases like:
{ name: "valid - with CRL distribution points", args: args{ cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ ValidFor: time.Minute, CRLDistributionPoints: []string{ "http://crl.example.com/root.crl", "http://crl2.example.com/root.crl", }, }, }, verify: func(t *testing.T, cert *x509.Certificate) { require.ElementsMatch(t, []string{ "http://crl.example.com/root.crl", "http://crl2.example.com/root.crl", }, cert.CRLDistributionPoints, ) }, },Also, consider adding negative test cases for invalid CRL URLs.
Line range hint
277-290: Enhance certificate validation in tests.The current validation only checks if the certificate is non-empty. Consider adding more detailed validation of the generated certificate's fields.
Example enhancement:
- require.NotEmpty(t, got) + block, _ := pem.Decode(got) + require.NotNil(t, block) + require.Equal(t, "CERTIFICATE", block.Type) + + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) + require.NoError(t, err) + if tt.verify != nil { + tt.verify(t, cert) + }
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (5 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (3 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go
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🔇 Additional comments (15)
cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile (1)
14-15: LGTM! Good optimization of the Dockerfile.The consolidation of multiple RUN commands into a single command is a good practice as it reduces the number of layers in the final image, making it more efficient.
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (1)
1-8: LGTM! Good practice using black box testing.The change to a separate test package with
_testsuffix follows Go's best practices for black box testing, which helps ensure the tests are validating the public API.pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go (4)
1-8: LGTM! Good practice moving to a separate test package.Moving to a separate test package (
generateCertificate_test) is a good practice as it ensures we're testing the public API as external consumers would use it.
11-14: LGTM! Correct usage of fully qualified type.The update to use
generateCertificate.Configurationis correct and necessary after moving to a test package.
Line range hint
64-78: Verify test helper accessibility.The test execution looks good, but let's verify the accessibility of the
generateRootCAtest helper since we're now in a separate test package.#!/bin/bash # Verify the generateRootCA test helper exists and is accessible rg -g '**/*_test.go' "func generateRootCA"
Line range hint
15-63: Add test cases for CRL Distribution Points.The test suite covers various certificate configurations but lacks test cases for the new CRL Distribution Points feature. Consider adding test cases that verify:
- Certificate generation with CRL Distribution Points
- Empty CRL Distribution Points
- Invalid CRL Distribution Points (if applicable)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (3)
1-11: LGTM! Well-structured package organization.The change to an external test package with
_testsuffix follows Go best practices for test organization and prevents import cycles.
Line range hint
13-21: Verify test coverage for CRL Distribution Points.While the helper function is well-structured, it should be enhanced to test the new CRL Distribution Points functionality mentioned in the PR objectives.
Consider adding test cases with CRL Distribution Points by modifying the configuration:
func generateRootCA(t *testing.T, cfg generateCertificate.Configuration) ([]*x509.Certificate, *ecdsa.PrivateKey) { + // Add test cases with CRL Distribution Points + if len(cfg.CRLDistributionPoints) == 0 { + cfg.CRLDistributionPoints = []string{"http://example.com/crl"} + } privateKey, err := cfg.GenerateKey() require.NoError(t, err)
Line range hint
1-85: Verify related coverage gaps in basicCertificateSigner.go.The PR coverage report indicates gaps in basicCertificateSigner.go. Let's verify if any uncovered lines are related to the CRL Distribution Points functionality being tested here.
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (3)
111-112: Verify CRLDistributionPoints validation.The CRLDistributionPoints are passed directly to the signer without validation. Ensure that the Configuration struct or the signer validates these URLs to prevent invalid or malicious CRL endpoints.
Let's check for validation:
#!/bin/bash # Look for CRLDistributionPoints validation in the codebase rg -A 5 "CRLDistributionPoints.*validate|validate.*CRLDistributionPoints" # Check the Configuration struct definition ast-grep --pattern 'type Configuration struct { $$$ CRLDistributionPoints $_ $$$ }'
12-18: LGTM! Well-structured constants for X.509 extensions.The introduction of ASN.1 OID constants improves code maintainability and reduces the risk of typos in critical identifiers. The OIDs match standard X.509 extension identifiers.
Let's verify the import compatibility:
✅ Verification successful
Let me try a different approach to verify the import changes.
This will help us:
- See all device-related imports to verify version consistency
- Specifically check signer package imports to ensure they match the v2 upgrade
Based on the search results, I can now generate the final response as we have comprehensive information about the imports across the codebase.
Import path update to v2 is consistent across the codebase
The search results confirm that all imports of the
github.com/plgd-dev/devicepackage consistently use the v2 version, including the security/signer package. No v1 imports were found, indicating proper version alignment throughout the codebase.The ASN.1 OID constants are well-defined and match standard X.509 extension identifiers, improving code maintainability.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any remaining v1 imports that need updating rg --type go "github.com/plgd-dev/device/pkg/" -lLength of output: 49
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check all Go imports in the repository rg --type go "github.com/plgd-dev/device" -A 1 -B 1 # Also check specifically for the signer package imports rg --type go "plgd-dev/device.*security/signer" -A 1 -B 1Length of output: 75648
42-44: Consider the implications of non-critical extensions.While the refactoring to use constants is good, all extensions (BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, ExtKeyUsage) are marked as non-critical. For security-sensitive certificates, some of these extensions (especially KeyUsage) should potentially be marked as critical to prevent certificate misuse.
Let's check the industry practice:
Also applies to: 58-60, 74-76
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3)
1-17: LGTM! Well-structured package and imports.The package follows Go's black-box testing conventions with proper separation and necessary imports.
19-33: LGTM! Well-structured test setup.The test setup provides a clear base configuration and proper key generation.
200-220: LGTM! Thorough CSR verification.The test execution properly verifies both the PEM encoding and the parsed CSR structure.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1)
67-71: Consider renamingsignedCsrtosignedCertfor clarityThe variable
signedCsrholds the signed certificate, not a CSR. Renaming it tosignedCertimproves code readability and clarity.Apply this diff to rename the variable:
signedCsr, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &template, s.caCert[0], certificateRequest.PublicKey, s.caKey) if err != nil { return nil, err } - return pkgX509.CreatePemChain(s.caCert, signedCsr) + return pkgX509.CreatePemChain(s.caCert, signedCert)Don't forget to update the variable name in both its declaration and where it's used in
CreatePemChain.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go (1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (4)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go
🧰 Additional context used
🔇 Additional comments (10)
pkg/security/x509/validate.go (1)
8-15: LGTM! The implementation is secure and well-structured.The function correctly validates CRL distribution points using the strict
url.ParseRequestURIfor URL validation, with proper error handling and informative error messages.pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1)
110-125: LGTM! The implementation is secure and follows best practices.The new
ParseAndCheckCertificateRequestfunction:
- Properly handles PEM decoding and CSR parsing
- Includes essential signature validation
- Has comprehensive error handling
- Follows Go idioms and security best practices
Let's verify the function's usage across the codebase:
✅ Verification successful
Based on the results, I can now generate the final response since I have sufficient information about the usage of the
ParseAndCheckCertificateRequestfunction across the codebase.Function is properly integrated and consistently used
The verification shows that
ParseAndCheckCertificateRequestis:
- Correctly implemented in
pkg/security/x509/parse.go- Properly used in both certificate signers:
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.gopkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go- The only CSR parsing implementation in the codebase (no duplicate/inconsistent patterns found)
The function's integration aligns well with the PR's goal of extending signers with CRL Distribution Points support.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Verify the usage of ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest to ensure it's properly integrated # with the CRL Distribution Points feature. # Test: Search for function usage echo "Searching for ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest usage..." rg -A 3 "ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest" # Test: Look for related CSR handling code to ensure consistent approach echo "Checking for other CSR handling patterns..." ast-grep --pattern 'x509.ParseCertificateRequest'Length of output: 1204
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (8)
15-21: Struct definition looks goodThe
BasicCertificateSignerstruct is defined appropriately with all necessary fields.
23-31: Constructor function is implemented correctlyThe
NewBasicCertificateSignerfunction correctly initializes theBasicCertificateSignerstruct with the provided parameters.
33-37: CSR parsing and error handling are correctly implementedThe
Signmethod properly parses the CSR usingpkgX509.ParseAndCheckCertificateRequestand handles errors appropriately.
39-45: Serial number generation is appropriateThe serial number is generated securely using
rand.Intwith a 128-bit range.
46-48: CRL distribution points are validated correctlyThe CRL distribution points are validated using
pkgX509.ValidateCRLDistributionPoints, ensuring they meet necessary criteria.
56-56: Duplicate comment detected and acknowledgedA previous review comment addresses the use of
SignatureAlgorithm. Please refer to the existing comment for guidance.
61-61: Duplicate comment detected and acknowledgedA previous review comment discusses the inclusion of
certificateRequest.Extensionswithout validation. Please review the existing comment for details.
64-66: CA certificate presence is properly checkedThe code appropriately checks for the presence of CA certificates before proceeding with signing.
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (7)
pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go (1)
11-38: Consider adding more edge cases to improve test coverage.While the current test cases cover basic scenarios, consider adding the following cases to make the test suite more robust:
- Multiple invalid URLs in the same slice
- Malformed URLs (e.g., "http://")
- URLs with non-HTTP/HTTPS schemes
- URLs exceeding maximum length (if there's a limit)
Example addition:
{ name: "Valid - Nil CRL distribution points", crlPoints: nil, }, + { + name: "Multiple invalid URLs", + crlPoints: []string{"invalid-url-1", "invalid-url-2"}, + wantErr: true, + }, + { + name: "Malformed URL", + crlPoints: []string{"http://"}, + wantErr: true, + }, + { + name: "Non-HTTP scheme", + crlPoints: []string{"ftp://example.com/crl"}, + wantErr: true, + },pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1)
46-48: Move CRL validation to the beginning of the methodThe CRL validation should occur before any resource-intensive operations like serial number generation.
Move the validation block to the beginning of the method:
func (s *BasicCertificateSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, csr []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if err := pkgX509.ValidateCRLDistributionPoints(s.crlDistributionPoints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } certificateRequest, err := pkgX509.ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest(csr) if err != nil { return nil, err } - if err = pkgX509.ValidateCRLDistributionPoints(s.crlDistributionPoints); err != nil { - return nil, err - }pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (2)
116-171: Well-structured test implementation for CRL Distribution Points!The test implementation follows good practices:
- Uses table-driven tests for better maintainability
- Covers essential test cases including valid URLs, duplicates, invalid URLs, and empty lists
- Clear test case names that describe the scenario being tested
Consider adding these additional test cases to improve coverage:
- Multiple invalid URLs in the same list
- URLs with different schemes (https://, ldap://)
- Maximum length URLs
- URLs with special characters
{ name: "Multiple invalid URLs", cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ CRLDistributionPoints: []string{ "invalid-url-1", "invalid-url-2", }, }, wantErr: true, }, { name: "Mixed URL schemes", cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ CRLDistributionPoints: []string{ "http://example.com/crl1", "https://example.com/crl2", "ldap://example.com/crl3", }, }, want: []string{ "http://example.com/crl1", "https://example.com/crl2", "ldap://example.com/crl3", }, },
163-169: Enhance error validation for invalid URL cases.While the current error checking is sufficient, consider adding more specific error assertions to ensure the correct error types are being returned.
Add assertions to validate the error message or type:
if tt.wantErr { - require.Error(t, err) + require.Error(t, err) + require.ErrorContains(t, err, "invalid URL format") return }pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1)
170-181: Enhance CSR template with additional fields for better test coverage.The CSR template is minimal, only setting the SignatureAlgorithm. Consider adding more fields that would be present in real-world scenarios, such as Subject, DNSNames, or EmailAddresses, especially since this PR adds CRL Distribution Points support.
Example enhancement:
template := &x509.CertificateRequest{ SignatureAlgorithm: x509.ECDSAWithSHA256, + Subject: pkix.Name{ + CommonName: "test.example.com", + Organization: []string{"Test Org"}, + }, + DNSNames: []string{"test.example.com"}, }pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (1)
Line range hint
221-290: Add test cases for certificate generation with CRL Distribution Points.The test suite should be extended to verify certificate generation with CRL Distribution Points. Consider adding the following test cases:
- Valid certificate with CRL Distribution Points
- Invalid CRL Distribution Points (malformed URLs)
Example test case:
{ name: "valid - with CRL distribution points", args: args{ cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ ValidFor: time.Minute, CRLDistributionPoints: []string{"http://crl.example.com/root.crl"}, }, }, }, { name: "invalid - malformed CRL distribution points", args: args{ cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{ ValidFor: time.Minute, CRLDistributionPoints: []string{"invalid-url"}, }, }, wantErr: true, },pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1)
311-318: Consider wrapping validation error for better context.The implementation is robust with validation, defensive copying, sorting, and deduplication. Consider wrapping the validation error to provide more context.
func (cfg Configuration) ToCRLDistributionPoints() ([]string, error) { if err := pkgX509.ValidateCRLDistributionPoints(cfg.CRLDistributionPoints); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CRL distribution points: %w", err) } cdp := slices.Clone(cfg.CRLDistributionPoints) slices.Sort(cdp) return slices.Compact(cdp), nil }
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📒 Files selected for processing (24)
- Makefile (1 hunks)
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (3 hunks)
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile (1 hunks)
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (5 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go (1 hunks)
- test/signer.go (1 hunks)
- test/test.go (1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (16)
- Makefile
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go
- test/signer.go
🧰 Additional context used
🔇 Additional comments (15)
pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go (2)
1-8: LGTM! Package and imports are well-organized.The package name follows Go conventions for external tests, and imports are clean and necessary.
1-50: Verify test coverage for ValidateCRLDistributionPoints.According to the PR objectives,
pkg/security/x509/validate.gohas low coverage (33.33%). Let's verify which branches are not covered.pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (2)
1-14: LGTM: Clean package structure and importsThe imports are well-organized and appropriate for certificate signing functionality.
15-21: LGTM: Well-structured signer typeThe
BasicCertificateSignerstruct contains all necessary fields for certificate signing, including the newcrlDistributionPointsfield.pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (4)
96-101: Changes look good overall!The integration of CRL distribution points is well-structured with proper error handling. The code maintains consistency with the existing certificate generation flow.
44-56: Verify ASN1 identifier constants.The code references
ASN1BasicConstraints,ASN1KeyUsage, andASN1ExtKeyUsageconstants. Please ensure these are properly defined and documented.Let's verify the constants' definitions:
#!/bin/bash # Search for ASN1 constant definitions rg "ASN1.*\s*=\s*" --type go
96-100: Verify CRL distribution points configuration method.The code calls
cfg.ToCRLDistributionPoints()but we need to ensure this method properly handles empty or invalid configurations.Let's check the implementation:
#!/bin/bash # Search for ToCRLDistributionPoints method implementation ast-grep --pattern 'func $_ ToCRLDistributionPoints() ([]string, error) { $$$ }'
16-18: Add documentation for the exported type.Since
BasicConstraintsis now exported, please add a documentation comment explaining its purpose and usage.Let's verify if this type is used by other packages:
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1)
116-171: Consider adding integration tests with x509 validation.The PR objectives indicate low coverage (33.33%) in
pkg/security/x509/validate.go. While these unit tests are good, consider adding integration tests that verify the interaction betweenToCRLDistributionPointsand the underlying x509 validation logic.Let's check the validation logic implementation:
pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (2)
183-197: LGTM! Well-documented signature tampering approach.The function provides a good test case for signature validation by effectively tampering with the CSR signature in a controlled manner.
199-237: 🛠️ Refactor suggestionAdd test cases for CRL Distribution Points scenarios.
Since this PR extends signers to set CRL Distribution Points, consider adding the following test cases:
- CSR with valid CRL Distribution Points
- CSR with invalid CRL Distribution Points (e.g., malformed URLs)
Let's verify if the ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest function handles CRL Distribution Points:
Example test cases to add:
{ name: "CSR with Valid CRL Distribution Points", csr: generateCSRWithCRLPoints(t, []string{"http://valid.example.com/crl"}), }, { name: "CSR with Invalid CRL Distribution Points", csr: generateCSRWithCRLPoints(t, []string{"invalid-url"}), wantErr: true, },test/test.go (1)
125-126: Implementation looks good, but test coverage needs improvementThe function signature and implementation correctly handle the new
crlDistributionPointsparameter. However, as previously noted in the reviews, test coverage for CRL Distribution Points functionality needs improvement.Let's verify the test coverage for this functionality:
Consider adding test cases that:
- Verify certificate generation with non-nil CRL Distribution Points
- Validate the presence of CRL Distribution Points in the generated certificates
- Test with invalid CRL Distribution Points values
- Test with empty CRL Distribution Points slice
Example test structure:
func TestNewIdentityCertificateSignerWithCRLDP(t *testing.T) { testCases := []struct { name string crlDistributionPoints []string wantErr bool }{ { name: "Valid CRL Distribution Points", crlDistributionPoints: []string{"http://crl.example.com/root.crl"}, wantErr: false, }, // Add more test cases... } // Test implementation... }pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (1)
280-281: Update generateRootCA helper function for CRL Distribution Points.The
generateRootCAhelper function (not shown in this file) should be reviewed and updated if necessary to properly handle CRL Distribution Points in the root CA certificate.Let's verify the helper function implementation:
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (2)
12-12: LGTM: Import changes are appropriate.The added imports support the new CRL Distribution Points functionality:
slicesfor slice operationspkgX509for CRL validationAlso applies to: 17-17
62-65: LGTM: Configuration struct changes are well-structured.The new
CRLDistributionPointsfield is properly integrated with appropriate yaml and CLI flag tags. Field reordering maintains clean organization.
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🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (9)
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (2)
15-21: Add documentation for the struct and its fields.
Consider adding documentation to explain the purpose of the struct and its fields, especially the new crlDistributionPoints field. This will help other developers understand the usage and requirements.
Add documentation like this:
+// BasicCertificateSigner implements a certificate signer that uses a CA certificate
+// and private key to sign certificate requests.
type BasicCertificateSigner struct {
+ // caCert is the CA certificate chain used for signing
caCert []*x509.Certificate
+ // caKey is the private key corresponding to the first CA certificate
caKey crypto.PrivateKey
+ // validNotBefore is the start time for issued certificates
validNotBefore time.Time
+ // validNotAfter is the expiration time for issued certificates
validNotAfter time.Time
+ // crlDistributionPoints contains the CRL distribution point URLs to be included in issued certificates
crlDistributionPoints []string
}33-33: Remove unused context parameter.
The context parameter is ignored (marked with _). If there's no plan to use it for cancellation or timeouts, consider removing it to simplify the API.
-func (s *BasicCertificateSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, csr []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+func (s *BasicCertificateSigner) Sign(csr []byte) ([]byte, error) {pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1)
110-125: LGTM with minor suggestions for error messages.
The implementation correctly handles CSR parsing and validation with proper error handling. However, the error messages could be more descriptive to aid in troubleshooting.
Consider enhancing the error messages:
- return nil, errors.New("pem not found")
+ return nil, errors.New("failed to decode PEM block: CSR data not found in PEM format")pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1)
116-171: Well-structured test implementation for CRL Distribution Points!
The test implementation follows best practices:
- Uses table-driven tests for better maintainability
- Covers essential test cases including edge cases
- Has clear test names and assertions
- Properly handles error cases
- Efficiently handles duplicate URLs
Consider adding these additional test cases to improve coverage:
- Multiple invalid URLs in the same config
- URLs with different schemes (https://, ldap://)
- URLs with special characters that need encoding
- Maximum length URLs
{
name: "Multiple schemes",
cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{
"http://example.com/crl1",
"https://example.com/crl2",
"ldap://example.com/crl3",
},
},
want: []string{
"http://example.com/crl1",
"https://example.com/crl2",
"ldap://example.com/crl3",
},
},
{
name: "URLs with special characters",
cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{
"http://example.com/crl?name=test&version=1",
"http://example.com/crl/test space",
},
},
want: []string{
"http://example.com/crl?name=test&version=1",
"http://example.com/crl/test%20space",
},
},client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (1)
86-86: LGTM! Consider adding documentation.
The integration of CRL Distribution Points into the signer creation flow is well-implemented. Consider adding documentation to describe the expected format and validation rules for CRL Distribution Points.
Add a comment above the function:
// newDeviceOwnershipSDK creates a new device ownership SDK instance.
// crlDistributionPoints specifies the CRL Distribution Points to be included
// in issued certificates. Each point should be a valid URI.Also applies to: 111-111
pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (3)
170-181: Consider enhancing the CSR template with additional fields.
The CSR template is minimal and could be enhanced to test more real-world scenarios. Consider adding common fields like Subject, DNSNames, EmailAddresses, etc., to make the test cases more comprehensive.
Example enhancement:
template := &x509.CertificateRequest{
SignatureAlgorithm: x509.ECDSAWithSHA256,
+ Subject: pkix.Name{
+ CommonName: "test.example.com",
+ Organization: []string{"Test Org"},
+ },
+ DNSNames: []string{"test.example.com"},
+ EmailAddresses: []string{"test@example.com"},
}183-197: Document the signature tampering approach.
While the implementation is functional, it would be helpful to document why modifying the last byte is sufficient to invalidate the signature. Consider adding a detailed comment explaining the approach and its implications.
Example enhancement:
- // Tamper with the CSR bytes to invalidate the signature
+ // Tamper with the CSR bytes to invalidate the signature.
+ // The last bytes of a DER-encoded CSR contain the signature value.
+ // Modifying any bit in the signature makes it invalid while keeping the CSR structure intact.
csrBytes[len(csrBytes)-1] ^= 0xFF199-237: Enhance test coverage with additional cases and specific error assertions.
While the test cases cover the basic scenarios, consider these improvements:
- Add edge cases like empty CSR, nil input
- Assert specific error types/messages to ensure correct error handling paths
- Add test cases for CSRs with different key types (RSA, ED25519)
Example enhancement:
tests := []struct {
name string
csr []byte
wantErr bool
+ errMsg string // Add expected error message
}{
{
name: "Valid CSR",
csr: generateValidCSR(t),
},
+ {
+ name: "Empty Input",
+ csr: []byte{},
+ wantErr: true,
+ errMsg: "empty CSR data",
+ },
// ... existing cases ...
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := pkgX509.ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest(tt.csr)
if tt.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err)
+ if tt.errMsg != "" {
+ require.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errMsg)
+ }
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
})
}pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (1)
Line range hint 221-291: Add certificate generation tests for CRL Distribution Points.
The test cases should be extended to verify that CRL Distribution Points are correctly included in the generated certificates. Consider adding:
- Test case with valid CRL Distribution Points
- Test case with multiple CRL Distribution Points
- Verification of the CRL Distribution Points extension in the generated certificate
Example test case:
{
name: "valid - with CRL Distribution Points",
args: args{
cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{
ValidFor: time.Minute,
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{
"http://crl1.example.com/root.crl",
"http://crl2.example.com/root.crl",
},
},
},
verify: func(t *testing.T, cert *x509.Certificate) {
require.ElementsMatch(t,
cfg.CRLDistributionPoints,
cert.CRLDistributionPoints,
"CRL Distribution Points not set correctly")
},
},📜 Review details
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Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (24)
- Makefile (1 hunks)
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (3 hunks)
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile (1 hunks)
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (5 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go (1 hunks)
- test/signer.go (1 hunks)
- test/test.go (1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (15)
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go
- test/signer.go
- test/test.go
🔇 Additional comments (15)
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (2)
41-45:
Use crypto/rand directly for serial number generation.
For better security and consistency, use crypto/rand directly with big.Int instead of using it through math/rand.
- serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, serialNumberLimit)
+ serialNumber := new(big.Int)
+ if _, err := crypto/rand.Read(serialNumber.SetInt64(0).Bytes()); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ serialNumber.Mod(serialNumber, serialNumberLimit)Likely invalid or redundant comment.
71-71: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Validate the returned certificate chain.
Consider validating the returned certificate chain to ensure it's complete and properly formed.
Add validation after creating the chain:
- return pkgX509.CreatePemChain(s.caCert, signedCsr)
+ chain, err := pkgX509.CreatePemChain(s.caCert, signedCsr)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ if err := validateCertificateChain(chain); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid certificate chain: %w", err)
+ }
+ return chain, nilpkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (3)
44-56: LGTM! Good use of constants for ASN.1 Object Identifiers.
The change improves code maintainability by using named constants instead of raw OIDs.
96-103: Consider implementing CRL availability monitoring.
While the code correctly adds CRL distribution points to certificates, consider implementing a monitoring system to:
- Periodically verify that the CRL endpoints are accessible
- Monitor CRL file freshness
- Alert on any issues that could affect certificate validation
This helps ensure the reliability of your certificate revocation infrastructure.
Note: The previous review comment about URL validation is still applicable.
16-18: LGTM! Verify the struct's usage across the codebase.
The struct rename follows Go conventions for exported types.
✅ Verification successful
The struct rename is safe and consistent across the codebase
The verification shows that:
- The struct is properly exported and used consistently across multiple files in the
pkg/security/generateCertificatepackage - All references to
BasicConstraintsare properly cased, with no lingering lowercase usage - The struct is used in certificate generation, tests, and configuration as expected
- The change maintains backward compatibility as evidenced by existing usages in
cmd/ocfclient/main.go
🏁 Scripts executed
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#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the usage of BasicConstraints struct across the codebase
# to ensure the rename doesn't break any existing code.
# Test: Search for both old and new names
echo "Checking for any remaining uses of old name 'basicConstraints':"
rg -i "basicConstraints" --type go
echo -e "\nChecking usage of new name 'BasicConstraints':"
rg "BasicConstraints" --type go
Length of output: 4519
pkg/security/x509/parse.go (2)
110-125: Verify integration with CRL Distribution Points feature.
While this function provides clean CSR validation, let's verify its integration with the CRL Distribution Points feature.
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check how this function is used in the CRL Distribution Points implementation
# Test: Look for usage in the signer implementation
echo "Checking usage in certificate signing process..."
rg -A 10 "ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest.*CRLDistributionPoints"
# Test: Look for related CRL Distribution Points configuration
echo "Checking CRL Distribution Points configuration..."
ast-grep --pattern 'type $_ struct {
$$$
CRLDistributionPoints $_
$$$
}'110-125: Verify test coverage for error scenarios.
The function handles three potential error cases (PEM decode, ParseCertificateRequest, CheckSignature). Let's verify the test coverage.
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more specific information about the test coverage.
Test coverage for error scenarios is comprehensive
The test file includes thorough coverage for ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest with test cases for all three error scenarios:
- Invalid PEM data: tested with "Invalid PEM" case using malformed input
- Parse failure: tested with "Invalid CSR" case using malformed CSR data
- Signature verification: tested with "Invalid Signature" case by tampering with CSR bytes
A valid case is also tested to ensure proper functionality.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check test coverage for ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest error scenarios
# Test 1: Look for test cases in the corresponding test file
echo "Searching for test cases..."
rg -A 5 "TestParseAndCheckCertificateRequest" pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go
# Test 2: Verify error scenario coverage
echo "Checking error scenario coverage..."
rg "ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest.*return.*nil.*err" pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go
Length of output: 5797
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for test file existence and its content
echo "Checking test file content..."
if [ -f pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go ]; then
cat pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go
else
echo "Test file not found"
fi
# Also check for any test files that might contain relevant tests
echo -e "\nSearching for other potential test files..."
fd -e go -x grep -l "ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest" {}
Length of output: 7338
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1)
116-171: Verify test coverage of related CRL functionality.
While this test covers the configuration parsing well, there are coverage gaps in related files mentioned in the PR objectives.
Let's analyze the coverage of CRL-related code paths:
Consider adding test cases for:
- Error paths in
basicCertificateSigner.go - CRL validation in certificate generation
- Integration tests for the complete CRL distribution points flow
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more information about the test coverage of CRL-related functionality.
Test coverage for CRL functionality is adequate
The current test coverage for CRL-related functionality is comprehensive:
pkg/security/x509/validate_test.gotests the core CRL URL validationpkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.gocovers CRL configuration parsingpkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.goincludes certificate signing with CRL points- Error paths are properly tested in validation and configuration parsing
The test coverage concerns mentioned in the PR objectives appear to be related to other functionality, not the CRL distribution points implementation.
🏁 Scripts executed
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Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Find all CRL-related code paths that might need additional test coverage
# Look for CRL-related functions and types
echo "=== CRL-related code paths ==="
rg -l "CRLDistributionPoints?" pkg/security/
# Look for potential untested error paths
echo -e "\n=== Potential untested error paths ==="
ast-grep --pattern 'if err := $$$; err != nil {
return $$$, err
}'
# Look for validation functions that might need testing
echo -e "\n=== Validation functions ==="
rg -p "func.*Validate.*CRL" pkg/security/
Length of output: 3365
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check test coverage of CRL-related code paths
# Look at CRL-related test files and their contents
echo "=== CRL Test Coverage ==="
for f in $(rg -l "CRLDistributionPoints?" pkg/security/); do
if [[ $f == *_test.go ]]; then
echo -e "\nFile: $f"
rg -A 5 "func Test.*CRL|func Test.*Certificate" "$f"
fi
done
# Look at implementation of CRL validation
echo -e "\n=== CRL Validation Implementation ==="
rg -A 10 "func.*ValidateCRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/x509/validate.go
# Check for untested CRL-related error paths
echo -e "\n=== Untested CRL Error Paths ==="
for f in pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go; do
echo -e "\nFile: $f"
rg -A 3 "CRLDistributionPoints?" "$f"
done
Length of output: 5044
client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (2)
82-82: LGTM! Clean propagation of CRL Distribution Points.
The change correctly forwards the CRL Distribution Points configuration to the SDK initialization.
42-49: LGTM! Verify CRL Distribution Points format.
The struct changes look good. The addition of CRLDistributionPoints and the updated CreateSignerFunc signature properly support the new functionality while maintaining backward compatibility.
Let's verify the CRL Distribution Points format in existing code:
✅ Verification successful
Let me analyze the CRL Distribution Points validation by checking the validation logic.
Let me check the test cases to understand the expected format and validation coverage.
CRL Distribution Points format is properly validated
The implementation has robust validation:
- Requires valid URLs (http/https)
- Handles empty slices and nil values
- Rejects invalid or empty URL strings
- Test coverage confirms the validation behavior
The struct changes in deviceOwnershipSDK.go are safe as the CRLDistributionPoints field is properly validated through ValidateCRLDistributionPoints function before use in certificate signers.
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The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for CRL Distribution Points usage patterns to ensure consistent format
rg -g '!{*.md,*.txt}' -i 'crl.*distribution.*points?' .
Length of output: 6310
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Get the validation logic for CRL Distribution Points
cat ./pkg/security/x509/validate.go
Length of output: 562
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Get the test cases for CRL Distribution Points validation
cat ./pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go
Length of output: 1112
pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1)
169-237: Overall implementation looks good!
The added test functions provide good coverage for CSR parsing and validation, following proper testing practices. The implementation aligns well with the PR objectives to extend signers with CRL Distribution Points. While there are opportunities for enhancement as noted in previous comments, the current implementation is solid and maintainable.
Makefile (1)
123-123: LGTM! Addition of intermediate CA environment variables.
The addition of intermediate CA certificate environment variables to the pkg tests aligns with the PR's objective of extending CRL Distribution Points support.
Let's verify that all certificate-related tests are properly configured:
✅ Verification successful
✅ Environment variables for intermediate CA certificates are properly configured
The test file pkg/security/x509/write_test.go contains tests that generate and use intermediate CA certificates, which aligns with the addition of these environment variables in the Makefile. The test implementation shows proper handling of intermediate certificates through the GenerateIntermediateCA and CreatePemChain functions.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for any pkg tests that might require these certificate variables
# Look for test files that might need the intermediate CA certificates
rg -l "TestIntermediate|TestCRL|intermediate.*[Cc]ertificate" pkg/
Length of output: 100
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the test file to understand the usage of intermediate certificates
rg -A 5 -B 5 "TestIntermediate|TestCRL|intermediate.*[Cc]ertificate" pkg/security/x509/write_test.go
Length of output: 545
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the test configuration and environment variable usage
rg -A 5 "INTERMEDIATE_CA_(CRT|KEY)" pkg/security/x509/
Length of output: 56
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3)
1-18: LGTM: Package and imports are well-structured.
The package name follows Go conventions for test files, and all imports are properly organized and necessary for the test implementations.
49-54: Refactor duplicated verification logic.
The verification logic for common fields (Subject, DNSNames) is duplicated across multiple test cases. This makes the tests harder to maintain and more prone to inconsistencies.
Also applies to: 66-70, 94-98, 127-130
43-198: Add test coverage for CRL Distribution Points.
Given that this PR extends signers to set CRL Distribution Points, test coverage for this feature is missing. Please add test cases to verify:
- Valid CRL Distribution Points
- Invalid CRL Distribution Points (e.g., malformed URLs)
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Actionable comments posted: 10
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (9)
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (2)
15-21: Add documentation for the struct and its fields.
Consider adding documentation to explain the purpose of the struct and its fields. This will help other developers understand how to use this type correctly.
+// BasicCertificateSigner implements a certificate signer that uses a CA certificate
+// and private key to sign certificate requests.
type BasicCertificateSigner struct {
+ // caCert is the CA certificate chain used for signing
caCert []*x509.Certificate
+ // caKey is the private key corresponding to the CA certificate
caKey crypto.PrivateKey
+ // validNotBefore is the start time for issued certificates
validNotBefore time.Time
+ // validNotAfter is the expiration time for issued certificates
validNotAfter time.Time
+ // crlDistributionPoints contains the CRL distribution point URLs
crlDistributionPoints []string
}36-36: Document the Sign method and remove unused context parameter.
The method should be documented, and since the context parameter is unused (marked with _), consider removing it if there's no plan to use it in the future.
+// Sign creates a signed certificate from the provided CSR (Certificate Signing Request).
+// The certificate is signed using the CA certificate and private key, with validity
+// period and CRL distribution points configured in the signer.
+// Returns the signed certificate chain in PEM format.
-func (s *BasicCertificateSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, csr []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+func (s *BasicCertificateSigner) Sign(csr []byte) ([]byte, error) {pkg/security/x509/parse.go (2)
110-125: Add documentation for the new function.
Consider adding a documentation comment that describes the function's purpose, parameters, return values, and possible errors.
+// ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest parses a PEM-encoded Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
+// and verifies its signature. It returns the parsed CSR if successful.
+//
+// Parameters:
+// - csr: PEM-encoded Certificate Signing Request bytes
+//
+// Returns:
+// - *x509.CertificateRequest: Parsed and verified CSR
+// - error: Returns an error if PEM decoding fails, CSR parsing fails, or signature verification fails
func ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest(csr []byte) (*x509.CertificateRequest, error) {113-113: Enhance error messages for better debugging.
The error messages could be more descriptive to help with troubleshooting.
- return nil, errors.New("pem not found")
+ return nil, errors.New("failed to decode PEM block: no PEM data found")
- return nil, err
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate request: %w", err)
- return nil, err
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid certificate request signature: %w", err)Also applies to: 118-118, 122-122
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (2)
134-142: Consider adding a test case for URL normalization.
While the duplicate URL test case is good, consider adding a test case for URLs that are semantically equivalent but syntactically different (e.g., http://example.com/crl vs http://example.com/crl/).
144-151: Enhance invalid URL test coverage.
Consider expanding the invalid URL test case to cover more scenarios:
- URLs with invalid schemes (e.g.,
ftp://) - URLs with missing host
- URLs with invalid characters
{
name: "Invalid CRL URL",
cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{
- "invalid-url",
+ "invalid-url",
+ "ftp://example.com/crl",
+ "http:///missing-host",
+ "http://example.com/cr l",
},
},
wantErr: true,
},pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1)
193-194: Enhance comment clarity for signature tampering.
The current comment is vague about what's being modified. Consider being more specific about the modification and its impact.
-// Tamper with the CSR bytes to invalidate the signature
+// Modify the last byte of the CSR's ASN.1 DER encoding to invalidate the ECDSA signaturepkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (1)
Line range hint 221-290: Add CRL Distribution Points test cases to TestGenerateCertificate.
The certificate generation tests should also verify the CRL Distribution Points functionality.
Add these test cases:
{
name: "valid - with CRL distribution points",
args: args{
cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{
ValidFor: time.Minute,
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{"http://crl.example.com/root.crl"},
},
},
},
{
name: "invalid - malformed CRL distribution points",
args: args{
cfg: generateCertificate.Configuration{
ValidFor: time.Minute,
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{"invalid-url"},
},
},
wantErr: true,
},pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (1)
311-318: LGTM with a minor suggestion: Consider wrapping validation error.
The implementation is solid with good validation and processing steps. Consider wrapping the validation error to provide more context:
func (cfg Configuration) ToCRLDistributionPoints() ([]string, error) {
if err := pkgX509.ValidateCRLDistributionPoints(cfg.CRLDistributionPoints); err != nil {
- return nil, err
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CRL distribution points: %w", err)
}
cdp := slices.Clone(cfg.CRLDistributionPoints)
slices.Sort(cdp)
return slices.Compact(cdp), nil
}📜 Review details
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Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (24)
- Makefile (1 hunks)
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (3 hunks)
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile (1 hunks)
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (5 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go (1 hunks)
- test/signer.go (1 hunks)
- test/test.go (1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (15)
- Makefile
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go
- test/signer.go
- test/test.go
🔇 Additional comments (7)
pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1)
110-125: LGTM! The implementation is secure and well-structured.
The function correctly:
- Decodes the PEM block
- Parses the CSR using the standard crypto/x509 package
- Verifies the CSR signature
- Handles errors appropriately at each step
The implementation follows good security practices and integrates well with the existing codebase.
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1)
116-171: LGTM! Well-structured test cases for CRL Distribution Points.
The test function is well-organized with comprehensive test cases covering:
- Valid CRL URLs
- Duplicate URL handling
- Invalid URL validation
- Empty list scenario
The table-driven test approach and clear test case names make the test maintainable and easy to understand.
client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (1)
82-82: LGTM! Verify usage of CRL Distribution Points
The changes correctly propagate the CRL distribution points through the signing chain while maintaining proper error handling.
Let's verify that all certificate signers in the codebase handle CRL distribution points consistently:
Also applies to: 86-86, 111-111
✅ Verification successful
CRL Distribution Points implementation is consistent across the codebase
The verification confirms that CRL Distribution Points are consistently handled throughout the certificate generation chain:
- All certificate signers (
BasicCertificateSignerandOCFIdentityCertificate) properly validate and set CRL Distribution Points - The configuration structs (
DeviceOwnershipSDKConfigandConfiguration) correctly define the CRL Distribution Points field - Proper validation is performed via
ValidateCRLDistributionPointsbefore usage - The points are correctly propagated from config to certificate templates
- Test coverage exists for CRL Distribution Points handling
The changes in the review are safe and maintain consistency with the rest of the codebase.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify consistent handling of CRL distribution points across certificate signers
# Test 1: Check for any certificate signers that might need the CRL distribution points
echo "Checking for certificate signers..."
ast-grep --pattern 'type $_ struct {
$$$
Sign($$$) $$$
$$$
}'
# Test 2: Check for any direct certificate generation that might need updating
echo "Checking for certificate generation..."
rg -l "x509.CreateCertificate"
# Test 3: Check for any test cases that should be updated
echo "Checking for related test files..."
fd -g "*_test.go" | xargs rg -l "CreateSigner|Sign.*Certificate"
Length of output: 1059
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the certificate generation files to verify CRL distribution points handling
# Check how CRL distribution points are handled in certificate generation
echo "=== Checking CRL distribution points handling in certificate generation ==="
rg -A 5 -B 5 "CRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/generateCertificate/
rg -A 5 -B 5 "CRLDistributionPoints" pkg/security/signer/
# Check the interfaces and structs related to certificate signing
echo -e "\n=== Checking certificate signer interfaces and implementations ==="
ast-grep --pattern 'type $_ interface {
$$$
Sign($$$) $$$
$$$
}'
# Look for any certificate template or configuration structs
echo -e "\n=== Checking certificate configuration structs ==="
ast-grep --pattern 'type $_ struct {
$$$
CRLDistributionPoints $$$
$$$
}'
Length of output: 22114
pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1)
199-237: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add test cases for CRL Distribution Points and improve error assertions.
Two suggestions to enhance the test coverage:
-
Add test cases for CRL Distribution Points to align with the PR objectives:
-
Add more specific error assertions to validate the exact error conditions:
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := pkgX509.ParseAndCheckCertificateRequest(tt.csr)
if tt.wantErr {
- require.Error(t, err)
+ require.Error(t, err)
+ switch tt.name {
+ case "Invalid PEM":
+ require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to decode PEM block")
+ case "Invalid CSR":
+ require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to parse CSR")
+ case "Invalid Signature":
+ require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to verify signature")
+ }
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
})pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (2)
12-12: LGTM: Import changes are appropriate.
The new imports support the CRL Distribution Points functionality:
slicespackage for slice operationspkgX509for CRL validation
Also applies to: 17-17
62-65: LGTM: Configuration struct changes are well-structured.
The changes maintain good organization and documentation:
- Logical field grouping
- Consistent yaml/long tag format
- Clear description for CLI usage
cmd/ocfclient/main.go (1)
526-528: LGTM! Verify signer package integration.
The CreateSignerFunc signature has been correctly updated to support CRL Distribution Points, which aligns with the PR objectives. The function now properly handles errors and passes the CRL distribution points to the signer.
Let's verify the integration with the signer package:
✅ Verification successful
Integration with signer package verified successfully
The CreateSignerFunc implementation correctly integrates with the signer package. The NewOCFIdentityCertificate constructor in pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go properly accepts and validates CRL Distribution Points, matching the function signature used in the client code.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the signer package integration and usage
# Test: Check if the OCFIdentityCertificate constructor accepts CRL Distribution Points
ast-grep --pattern 'func NewOCFIdentityCertificate($_, $_, $_, $_, $_) ($_, $_)'
Length of output: 82
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's try a broader search to find the signer package and its implementation
fd "signer" --type f
# Then let's search for OCFIdentityCertificate in the codebase
rg "OCFIdentityCertificate" -A 5
Length of output: 5701
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Actionable comments posted: 3
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (24)
- Makefile (1 hunks)
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go (3 hunks)
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile (1 hunks)
- cmd/ocfclient/main.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go (5 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go (4 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go (3 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go (2 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go (1 hunks)
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go (1 hunks)
- test/signer.go (1 hunks)
- test/test.go (1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (21)
- Makefile
- client/deviceOwnershipSDK.go
- cmd/bridge-device/Dockerfile
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/config_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA_test.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA.go
- pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateRootCA_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go
- pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner.go
- pkg/security/signer/identityCertificateSigner_test.go
- pkg/security/x509/parse.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate.go
- pkg/security/x509/validate_test.go
- test/signer.go
- test/test.go
🔇 Additional comments (6)
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIdentityCertificate.go (3)
96-103: Consider validating CRL distribution points URLs.
While error handling is properly implemented, consider validating the URLs before passing them to the signer to ensure they are well-formed. This aligns with the previous review suggestion.
#!/bin/bash
# Check implementation of ToCRLDistributionPoints
ast-grep --pattern 'func $_ ToCRLDistributionPoints() ([]string, error) {
$$$
}'44-56: Verify ASN1 identifier constants are properly defined.
The code now uses constants for ASN1 object identifiers, which is a good practice. However, let's ensure these constants are properly defined and match the expected OIDs.
✅ Verification successful
ASN1 identifier constants are properly defined with correct OIDs
The constants are well-defined in pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateCertificate.go with standard OID values:
ASN1BasicConstraints: 2.5.29.19 (id-ce-basicConstraints)ASN1KeyUsage: 2.5.29.15 (id-ce-keyUsage)ASN1ExtKeyUsage: 2.5.29.37 (id-ce-extKeyUsage)
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for ASN1 constant definitions
rg 'ASN1(BasicConstraints|KeyUsage|ExtKeyUsage)\s*=' --type go
Length of output: 412
16-18: Add documentation for the exported type.
Since BasicConstraints is now exported, it should be documented following Go conventions. Additionally, verify the impact of this breaking change on external consumers.
pkg/security/x509/parse_test.go (1)
183-197: LGTM! Well-documented test helper.
The function effectively generates an invalid CSR by tampering with the signature, and the comment clearly explains the purpose.
cmd/ocfclient/main.go (2)
526-528: LGTM: CreateSignerFunc signature updated correctly.
The function signature has been properly updated to include CRL Distribution Points, maintaining consistency with the certificate signer interface.
526-528: Verify CRL Distribution Points integration.
Let's verify that the CRL Distribution Points functionality is properly integrated across the codebase.
✅ Verification successful
Based on the shell script results, I can now generate the final response:
CRL Distribution Points integration is properly implemented
The verification shows that CRL Distribution Points are well-integrated across the codebase:
- Properly defined in certificate configuration (
pkg/security/generateCertificate/config.go) - Correctly used in certificate generation (
pkg/security/generateCertificate/generateIntermediateCA.go,generateIdentityCertificate.go) - Implemented in certificate signers (
pkg/security/signer/basicCertificateSigner.go,identityCertificateSigner.go) - Validated in certificate validation code (
pkg/security/x509/validate.go)
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify CRL Distribution Points integration
# Look for any certificate generation or validation code that should be updated
# Search for certificate generation calls
echo "Checking certificate generation code..."
rg -l "GenerateRootCA|GenerateIntermediateCA|GenerateIdentityCert"
# Search for CRL Distribution Points usage
echo "Checking CRL Distribution Points usage..."
rg -l "CRLDistributionPoints"
# Check the configuration structure where CRL points are defined
echo "Checking configuration structure..."
ast-grep --pattern 'type Configuration struct {
$$$
}'
Length of output: 8494
|
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
BasicCertificateSignerto include CRL distribution points during certificate signing.Bug Fixes
Documentation
Tests
BasicCertificateSignerfunctionality to ensure robustness in certificate signing.