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12 changes: 12 additions & 0 deletions docs/acknowledgements.rst
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Acknowledgements
================

The Threat Modeling with ATT&CK team includes:

* Ben Ballard
* Tiffany Bergeron
* Mike Cunningham
* Mark Hasse
* Courtney Hassenfeldt
* Tyler Schechter
* Dr. Kyle Wallace
22 changes: 22 additions & 0 deletions docs/additional-resources.rst
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Additional Resources
====================

Add appendix here?

Cyber Threat Intelligence Resources
-----------------------------------

Leveraging existing CTI allows you to develop known attack vectors that could be used against your system. There are many resources for CTI data and this appendix is made to refence a few that we have found useful.

* The Center’s Sightings Ecosystem (https://mitre-engenuity.org/cybersecurity/center-for-threat-informed-defense/our-work/sightings-ecosystem/) project is an example of data that can be leveraged throughout this process to help identify, or highlight, commonly seen TTPs. At the time of publish, their work consists of over 1.6 million sightings of 353 unique techniques from almost 200 countries.
* Many venders publish opensource reports on blogs or their websites. Monitor these sources for new/relevant reports. Attack Flow created best practices for selecting open-source reports and this can be beneficial during this step:
* “* Reports should be transparent about where the data originates and provide a technically competent overview of an incident.
* Reports should originate from a vendor with a track record of accurate reporting and first-hand analysis of the incident in question.
* Reports should provide the most current information on the malware or breach.
* Reports should make it easy to identify any information gaps. Use multiple sources to address gaps and corroborate the data, if possible.
* Reports should distinguish between facts, assumptions, and analytical assessments.
* When available, use attribution and targeting information from reports to enrich your attack flows.”
* When it comes to researching CTI for embedded systems, MITRE developed a publicly available knowledge base called EMB3D. This is a great resource for both theory and evidence. Start by down selecting by embedded system property and read through the various threats to each.

It is a good idea to have a central location/repository for all your CTI data. This can be a spreadsheet or a threat intelligence platform (TIP) like OpenCTI (see example data below for FIN7). There are many TIP out there that will do to research work for you – automatically pulling in the latest vender reports. Some TIPs will even auto-parse the data in reports for you. Be sure to spot check any automated report parsing for accuracy.

51 changes: 51 additions & 0 deletions docs/center-projects.rst
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Other Center Projects
=====================

`CTI Blueprints <https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/cti-blueprints/wiki>`__ - *June 2023*
This project developed an approach and prototype tool for creating narrative cyber
threat intel reports that analysts need in the form they need them. Reports produced
using CTI Blueprints include structured STIX content, are tagged with ATT&CK reference,
and enable operational defensive cyber analysis, analytics testing, and adversary
emulation. We will establish a new normal for cyber threat intelligence. Producers will
create actionable intelligence for their consumers, and consumers will take specific
threat-informed action.

`Defending IAAS with ATT&CK <https://center-for-threat-informed-defense.github.io/defending-iaas-with-attack/>`__ - *November 2022*
Defending IaaS with ATT&CK developed an ATT&CK matrix that enables users to easily
understand and work with the techniques applicable to Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) environments, regardless of whether the attacks target the cloud management
layer, the container technology, or the hosted infrastructure. The project also
developed documentation and tools to simplify creating overlays for other domains
like Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Operational Technology (OT).

`Sensor Mappings <https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/sensor-mappings-to-attack>`__ – *December 2023*
The Sensor Mappings to ATT&CK Project (SMAP) is a collection of resources to assist
security operations teams and security leaders with understanding which tools,
capabilities, and events can help provide visibility into real-world adversary
behaviors potentially occurring in their environments. SMAP builds on MITRE ATT&CK®
Data Sources by connecting the conceptual data source representations of information
that can be collected to concrete logs, sensors, and other security capabilities
that provide that type of data.

`Sightings Ecosystem <https://mitre-engenuity.org/cybersecurity/center-for-threat-informed-defense/our-work/sightings-ecosystem/>`__ - *February 2022*
This project provides cybersecurity defenders and researchers with critical insight
into real-world, in the wild adversary behaviors mapped to ATT&CK. The ecosystem
aims to fundamentally advance the collective ability to see threat activity across
organizational, platform, vendor and geographical boundaries. Voluntarily
contributed raw “sightings”, or observations, of specific adversary TTPs are mapped
to ATT&CK, anonymized, and aggregated to produce intelligence describing insights
from that data.

`Summiting The Pyramid <https://center-for-threat-informed-defense.github.io/summiting-the-pyramid/>`__ – *September 2023*
Many analytics are dependent on specific tools or artifacts. Adversaries can easily
evade these with low-cost changes that exploit the dependencies. This project
developed a method to evaluate analytics relative to the adversary’s cost to evade.
We further created approaches and tips for defenders to make their analytics less
evadable. We demonstrated the methodology with a core set of analytics.

`Threat Report ATT&CK Mapper <https://mitre-engenuity.org/cybersecurity/center-for-threat-informed-defense/our-work/threat-report-attck-mapper-tram/>`__ - *August 2023*
Many analytics are dependent on specific tools or artifacts. Adversaries can easily
evade these with low-cost changes that exploit the dependencies. This project
developed a method to evaluate analytics relative to the adversary’s cost to evade.
We further created approaches and tips for defenders to make their analytics less
evadable. We demonstrated the methodology with a core set of analytics.
5 changes: 4 additions & 1 deletion docs/conf.py
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# ones.
extensions = [
"sphinx_rtd_theme",
"sphinx_toolbox",
"sphinx_toolbox.github",
]

github_username = "CTID"
github_repository = "CTID"
# Add any paths that contain templates here, relative to this directory.
templates_path = ["_templates"]

3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions docs/future-work.rst
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Future Work
===========
Here we can add any possible future work
9 changes: 9 additions & 0 deletions docs/index.rst
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:caption: Contents

introduction
question-1
question-2
question-3
question-4
additional-resources
future-work
acknowledgements
center-projects


Notice
------
42 changes: 32 additions & 10 deletions docs/introduction.rst
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Introduction
============
The process outlined in this paper details our recommended approach to integrating
ATT&CK into your organization’s existing threat modeling methodology. At the core of
this approach are four key questions, outlined in the Threat Modeling Manifesto, that
we need to answer:

.. TODO Add any chapters you wish as separate *.rst files that are referenced in the
index.rst. This file can contain an introduction if you want, or delete it and
create other chapters.
* Question 1: What are we working on?
* Question 2: What could go wrong?
* Question 3: What are we going to do about it?
* Question 4: Did we do a good job?

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor
incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud
exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure
dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur.
Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt
mollit anim id est laborum.
This process is intended for universal application to any system or technology stack
(large or small) using any existing threat modeling methodology like STRIDE, PASTA,
or Attack Trees. To demonstrate its use and applicability to a wide audience of
cybersecurity practitioners, we apply this process to a fictional internet of things
(IOT) system called the Ankle Monitoring Predictor of Stroke (AMPS). The fictional AMPS
device gives the wearer and their healthcare providers indications and warnings of a
stroke. The systems and subsystems that make up this device are modeled after a popular
commercially available IOT device and intentionally chosen for their mobile/cloud-based
dependencies. This broad application to a system spanning mobile and enterprise
environments allows readers to visualize how this process could be applied to their
problem sets. Examples throughout this paper are from the perspective of a security
team working for the AMPS manufacturer. They have been tasked with modeling threats
to the AMPS.

TESTING: preview builds
Using the process described throughout this paper, we identify critical
components of the AMPS, prioritize threats to those components, and recommend mitigations. Threat
modeling with ATT&CK allows us to leverage data from the Cyber Threat Intelligence
(CTI) community and significantly improve our results in Questions 2 and 3. The below
graphic is an overview of our recommended process to answer these questions. We will
break down our means of answering each question in further detail throughout the paper.

.. note::

The process will be accompanied by an example of a ficticious health device (AMPS).
Detailed examples will be available in collapsed sections throughout the process.
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